Mission Control
Oversight
The loop runs itself. Your job is judgment — approve what the machine proposes, decide what gets real capital, set the bar.
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Mission Control
The loop runs itself. Your job is judgment — approve what the machine proposes, decide what gets real capital, set the bar.
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Every night the machine walks this pipeline left to right. The funnel narrows on purpose — almost everything dies before the pen.
Promotion needs 13 forward paper weeks, of which at least 4 genuinely live (wall-clock, after nomination), plus the quality gates. A date below is the earliest the calendar allows — quality gates can still block after it passes.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.90 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.09 not positive.
The most recent backtests, newest first — every attempt is recorded before it is scored, wins and losses alike.
equity valuations are convex in real rates and the convexity is asymmetric — mandate floors and forced index rebalancing bias the response toward downward rate shocks — but when the Fed balance sheet and financial conditions reach an unusual joint state investors reprice tail risk and the convexity inverts; linear rate models cannot express that regime switch; primary dealers and indirect bidders absorbing a weak Treasury auction — a wide tail on thin bid-to-cover — reprice duration risk hours to days before that repricing reaches secondary yields, and the harvestable leg is not the bond but DURATION-SENSITIVE EQUITY: utilities, REITs and long-duration growth reprice on the same discount rate with a lag; it survives because rates desks that watch auction tails trade the bonds rather than equity sector rotation, and equity managers do not parse TreasuryDirect's auction JSON at all, leaving the cross-asset transmission unexploited at a monthly rebalance. Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
equity valuations are convex in real rates and the convexity is asymmetric — mandate floors and forced index rebalancing bias the response toward downward rate shocks — but when the Fed balance sheet and financial conditions reach an unusual joint state investors reprice tail risk and the convexity inverts; linear rate models cannot express that regime switch; primary dealers and indirect bidders absorbing a weak Treasury auction — a wide tail on thin bid-to-cover — reprice duration risk hours to days before that repricing reaches secondary yields, and the harvestable leg is not the bond but DURATION-SENSITIVE EQUITY: utilities, REITs and long-duration growth reprice on the same discount rate with a lag; it survives because rates desks that watch auction tails trade the bonds rather than equity sector rotation, and equity managers do not parse TreasuryDirect's auction JSON at all, leaving the cross-asset transmission unexploited at a monthly rebalance. Composition: combined as a weighted tilt, the forces should reinforce when aligned and cancel when opposed. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
Aggregate market read: neutral (-0.01)
How near the best research is to the 90% bar that lets a pattern enter the pen. Bars fall as more trials accumulate — that's deflation, not a bug.
large speculators front-run institutional rebalancing by 1-3 weeks, and at the extremes that becomes crowding: deeply long equity-futures positioning alongside deeply short 10-year-note positioning is an overcrowded risk-on bet that mean-reverts, and it survives because COT publishes with a lag, aggregates heterogeneous trader types, and the reversal window is narrow and regime-dependent; price trends persist as information diffuses slowly and investors herd, so assets above their long moving average keep outperforming those below (Moskowitz et al.). Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
large speculators front-run institutional rebalancing by 1-3 weeks, and at the extremes that becomes crowding: deeply long equity-futures positioning alongside deeply short 10-year-note positioning is an overcrowded risk-on bet that mean-reverts, and it survives because COT publishes with a lag, aggregates heterogeneous trader types, and the reversal window is narrow and regime-dependent; past 12-1 month relative winners keep outperforming because investors under-react to information and returns chase returns (Jegadeesh–Titman). Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
The machine stops here — these are the calls it isn't allowed to make.
Proven live-eligible — deflated Sharpe 99%, 32 paper weeks survived. The system will not risk money — whether to trade this is your call. review the evidence →
Proven live-eligible — deflated Sharpe 98%, 33 paper weeks survived. The system will not risk money — whether to trade this is your call. review the evidence →
Proven live-eligible — deflated Sharpe 99%, 32 paper weeks survived. The system will not risk money — whether to trade this is your call. review the evidence →
Proven live-eligible — deflated Sharpe 97%, 33 paper weeks survived. The system will not risk money —
weekly snapshot · 2026-11-09 (next: Monday 13:00)
The machine's standing schedule — this is the work that happens while you wait on the pen. Dots show each job's most recent actual run.
Changing these is a deliberate code change (edit criteria.ts + commit) — friction on purpose, so the bar is never lowered on a whim.
The loop runs on its own — these are for when you want to poke it now instead of waiting for the schedule.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.93 < 0.95.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.95 < 0.95.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.90 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.09 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.92 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.13 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: paper info-ratio -0.16 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: paper info-ratio n/a not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.91 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.09 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.93 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.06 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.94 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.02 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: paper info-ratio n/a not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.92 < 0.95; paper info-ratio n/a not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.94 < 0.95.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.87 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.24 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.80 < 0.95.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.90 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.34 not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.90 < 0.95.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.92 < 0.95; paper info-ratio n/a not positive.
Time gates met. Still blocked by: deflated Sharpe 0.81 < 0.95; paper info-ratio -0.14 not positive.
large speculators run crowding cycles that linear aggregation cannot see: CFTC net positioning stretched long in equity futures while simultaneously stretched short in 10-year notes is regime confusion — contradictory macro views held at once — and resolves within 2-3 weeks through forced rebalancing as carry unwinds collide with fading equity momentum; it survives because the professionals holding the positions cannot trade against their own hedges; primary dealers and indirect bidders absorbing a weak Treasury auction — a wide tail on thin bid-to-cover — reprice duration risk hours to days before that repricing reaches secondary yields, and the harvestable leg is not the bond but DURATION-SENSITIVE EQUITY: utilities, REITs and long-duration growth reprice on the same discount rate with a lag; it survives because rates desks that watch auction tails trade the bonds rather than equity sector rotation, and equity managers do not parse TreasuryDirect's auction JSON at all, leaving the cross-asset transmission unexploited at a monthly rebalance. Composition: expressed cross-sectionally, the combined score sorts the universe into relative winners and losers. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
large speculators run crowding cycles that linear aggregation cannot see: CFTC net positioning stretched long in equity futures while simultaneously stretched short in 10-year notes is regime confusion — contradictory macro views held at once — and resolves within 2-3 weeks through forced rebalancing as carry unwinds collide with fading equity momentum; it survives because the professionals holding the positions cannot trade against their own hedges; primary dealers and indirect bidders absorbing a weak Treasury auction — a wide tail on thin bid-to-cover — reprice duration risk hours to days before that repricing reaches secondary yields, and the harvestable leg is not the bond but DURATION-SENSITIVE EQUITY: utilities, REITs and long-duration growth reprice on the same discount rate with a lag; it survives because rates desks that watch auction tails trade the bonds rather than equity sector rotation, and equity managers do not parse TreasuryDirect's auction JSON at all, leaving the cross-asset transmission unexploited at a monthly rebalance. Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
macro releases are traded against an expectation, and the expectation is reconstructable from FRED's own vintage archive: the first published value minus a naive forecast built from the prior vintage path is a usable surprise even with no consensus tape, and those surprises accumulate because data-generating processes are autocorrelated and revisions arrive in batches; bond desks reprice within hours while equity flows lag several days as revisions propagate through analyst models and rebalancing calendars, so ACCUMULATED surprise leads equity repricing rather than coinciding with it; alone among the registered signals it reads what each number said ON THE DAY IT WAS PUBLISHED rather than today's revised history, so the surprise lives in the first-print-to-revision gap that no other module can see; investors overpay for positively-skewed lottery-like payoffs, so high-skew names are systematically overpriced and low-skew names earn a premium once the lottery demand is arbitraged out (Bali, Cakici & Whitelaw 2011). Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
sentiment extremes are contrarian only when the crowds holding them are CONFUSED: a persistent disagreement between retail survey sentiment and active managers' actual equity exposure means one group is liquidating into the other's accumulation, which resolves as a 2-3 week counter-move; it is the breadth of opinion rather than its extremity that marks exhaustion, so a shared extreme says nothing, and it is under-exploited because fusing two lagged weekly surveys is unglamorous work; investors overpay for positively-skewed lottery-like payoffs, so high-skew names are systematically overpriced and low-skew names earn a premium once the lottery demand is arbitraged out (Bali, Cakici & Whitelaw 2011). Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
convexity demand from hedgers and liability-driven investors shows up as the LONG end flattening while the belly stays steep, and when it does duration hedgers step back from Treasury purchases and funding conditions tighten in repo and OIS 5-10 days before the NFCI registers it; unlike signal-curve this reads the 20-day CHANGE in curvature rather than the absolute term-spread level, so it sees reversals that happen inside a bull-steepening or bear-flattening regime, and it survives because tracking it otherwise wants dealer-flow and repo data; investors overpay for positively-skewed lottery-like payoffs, so high-skew names are systematically overpriced and low-skew names earn a premium once the lottery demand is arbitraged out (Bali, Cakici & Whitelaw 2011). Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
retail survey sentiment is a lagged, noisy contrarian indicator on its own, but a sharp divergence from institutional futures positioning means equity positioning is split along retail-institutional lines and one side is about to be flushed; it fails in strong trends because herding persists, and pays at turning points where the divergence compresses within 3-8 days; investors overpay for positively-skewed lottery-like payoffs, so high-skew names are systematically overpriced and low-skew names earn a premium once the lottery demand is arbitraged out (Bali, Cakici & Whitelaw 2011). Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
Positive = risk-on (tilt toward equities), negative = risk-off (tilt toward defensives). These readings are what the search composes into candidate patterns.
large speculators front-run institutional rebalancing by 1-3 weeks, and at the extremes that becomes crowding: deeply long equity-futures positioning alongside deeply short 10-year-note positioning is an overcrowded risk-on bet that mean-reverts, and it survives because COT publishes with a lag, aggregates heterogeneous trader types, and the reversal window is narrow and regime-dependent; convexity demand from hedgers and liability-driven investors shows up as the LONG end flattening while the belly stays steep, and when it does duration hedgers step back from Treasury purchases and funding conditions tighten in repo and OIS 5-10 days before the NFCI registers it; unlike signal-curve this reads the 20-day CHANGE in curvature rather than the absolute term-spread level, so it sees reversals that happen inside a bull-steepening or bear-flattening regime, and it survives because tracking it otherwise wants dealer-flow and repo data. Composition: expressed cross-sectionally, the combined score sorts the universe into relative winners and losers. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
the NFCI aggregates credit, equity and rate stress into a leading gauge, so tightening financial conditions precede risk-asset drawdowns by weeks before they are priced into individual names; convexity demand from hedgers and liability-driven investors shows up as the LONG end flattening while the belly stays steep, and when it does duration hedgers step back from Treasury purchases and funding conditions tighten in repo and OIS 5-10 days before the NFCI registers it; unlike signal-curve this reads the 20-day CHANGE in curvature rather than the absolute term-spread level, so it sees reversals that happen inside a bull-steepening or bear-flattening regime, and it survives because tracking it otherwise wants dealer-flow and repo data. Composition: combined as a weighted tilt, the forces should reinforce when aligned and cancel when opposed. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
large speculators run crowding cycles that linear aggregation cannot see: CFTC net positioning stretched long in equity futures while simultaneously stretched short in 10-year notes is regime confusion — contradictory macro views held at once — and resolves within 2-3 weeks through forced rebalancing as carry unwinds collide with fading equity momentum; it survives because the professionals holding the positions cannot trade against their own hedges; convexity demand from hedgers and liability-driven investors shows up as the LONG end flattening while the belly stays steep, and when it does duration hedgers step back from Treasury purchases and funding conditions tighten in repo and OIS 5-10 days before the NFCI registers it; unlike signal-curve this reads the 20-day CHANGE in curvature rather than the absolute term-spread level, so it sees reversals that happen inside a bull-steepening or bear-flattening regime, and it survives because tracking it otherwise wants dealer-flow and repo data. Composition: used as a gate, the first force scales exposure to the rest — capturing a conditional, regime-dependent effect. This interaction is plausibly under-arbitraged because these are distinct, slow-moving forces that standard cross-sectional factor models largely ignore.
Data source: SEC EDGAR daily index, Form 8-K Item 5.02 (departure/appointment of officers and directors), legally required to be filed within four business days of the triggering event (lag 4 business days, text is the as-filed point-in-time record)
Abrupt, unexplained departures of a CEO or CFO disclosed under Item 5.02 often precede restatements, guidance cuts, or activist escalation that the market prices only partially on the filing day because the base rate of routine retirements is high and the market cannot cheaply tell 'for cause' apart from 'planned trans…
Data source: Senate Office of Public Records / House Clerk Lobbying Disclosure Act LD-2 database, quarterly CSV/XML, filed within 45 days of quarter-end by statute (lag 45d, first LD-2 filing used as point-in-time; amendments are separately dated and excluded from the as-of snapshot)
A firm's government-affairs team raises lobbying spend when it has private visibility into an approaching regulatory ruling, appropriations line item, or agency contract decision, and that spend is disclosed quarterly well before the resulting earnings event shows up in a 10-Q. Edge class: event-time effects — the rele…
Data source: SEC N-PORT monthly fund holdings, EDGAR full-text XML filings, filed within 60 days of month-end per Investment Company Act reporting rules (lag 60d, first filing is the point-in-time snapshot; later N-PORT/A amendments are rare and flagged separately)
When many same-style mutual funds and ETFs increase exposure to the same sector in the same month — driven by shared style-box mandates, benchmark rebalancing, or index-fund creation unit flows rather than independent research — the resulting price pressure tends to fade over the following month once the marginal insti…